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Abstract
The preferable implementation of article 47 of the First Geneva Convention 1949 is conducting 
activities in the format of military training and exercises rather than seminars. The contents, 
methodology as well as the instructor should be in accordance with military operations that 
will be encountered by the soldiers. “do what you have trained and train what you will do”. The 
implementation of article 47 GC I is related to article 82 and 87 AP I. Furthermore, within Tentara 
Nasional Indonesia (TNI) it is related with the formation of “the professional soldier” as enshrined 
in Article 2 section (4) of the Law No. 34 of 2004 of TNI. In addition to the increased awareness, 
some additional achievements related to operational and training aspects were also achieved in the 
period of 1998 – 2015. These include the issuance of Technical Guidance on the Implementation 
of international humanitarian law and human rights into the Training, the three standing ROEs 
and the TNI Commander decree on Prohibition of Torture. These all doctrinal impact are resulting 
from the dissemination program that may have influence on the betterment of the TNI operations 
in the future. However, some further improvements are required, among others, to improve the 
skills of the concerned officers to draft appropriate ROEs and to complement the legal unit with an 
operational law / international humanitarian law section. Moreover, the challenge for Indonesia in 
the future is to improve its enforcement mechanisms i.e. to enhance the military justice system to 
be more reliable and independent in line with the spirit of article 49 GC I.   
Keywords: international humanitarian law, armed conflict, military academy, dissemination 
program, laws of war.
Implementasi Pasal 47 Konvensi Jenewa I di Bidang Militer 
(Tinjauan Tantangan-Tantangan di Dalam Tentara Negara Indonesia)
Abstrak
Pelaksanaan Pasal 47 dalam Konvensi Genewa Pertama 1949 adalah melaksanakan aktivitas 
dalam format aktivitas pelatihan dan militer dibandingkan dengan melakukan seminar. Isi dari 
pelatihan, metodologi dan instruktur harus sesuai dengan operasi militer yang dihadapi oleh 
seorang prajurit, “lakukanlah apa yang telah dilatihkan kepadamu dan latihlahlah apa yang akan 
kamu lakukan”. Pelaksanaan pasal 47 Konvensi Genewa Pertama 1949 berkaitan dengan Pasal 
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82 dan 87 dari Konvensi yang sama. Lebih lanjut lagi, dalam Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI), 
berkaitan dengan pembentukan “prajurit profesional”  seperti yang disampaikan dalam Pasal 2 
ayat (4) Undang-undang No. 34 tahun 2004 mengenai TNI. Dalam rangka untuk meningkatkan 
kewaspadaan, beberapa capaian tambahan berkenaan dengan aspek operasional dan pelatihan 
juga dicapai dalam periode 1998-2015. Hal ini termasuk mengeluarkan Panduan Teknis mengenai 
Implementasi Hukum Humaniter Internasional dan HAM dalam pelatihan, dan tiga pilar ROEs 
dan keputusan Panglima TNI tentang Larangan Penyiksaan. Semua doktrin ini lahir dari dampak 
diseminasi dalam program pelatihan untuk melahirkan prajurit TNI yang lebih baik dimasa yang 
akan datang. Meskipun demikian, sejumlah peningkatan terhadap pengetahuan mengenai hukum 
humaniter telah tumbuh dikalangan prajutit TNI. Tantangan selanjutnya adalah mendorong 
peningkatan mekanisme pentaatan, misalnya mendorong sistem pengadilan militer untuk lebih 
indeoenden dan dapat diandalkan sejalan dengan semangat Pasal 49 Konvensi Genewa Pertama 
1949.
Kata kunci: hukum humaniter, konflik bersenjata, akademi militer, program diseminasi, hukum 
perang.
A. Introduction
Indonesia has ratified the Geneva Conventions 
of 1949 (hereinafter the Geneva conventions 
or GC)1  by enacted the Law No. 59 of 1958 
without any reservation. All the total of 4292 
articles of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 
are certainly very important to respect and 
implement by any country particularly in time of 
armed conflict. Those articles are materialized 
the humanitarian principles that have to be 
respected in a very delicate situation i.e. armed 
conflict. Indeed, the urgency to respect and 
implement the GC is even more important 
nowadays as the casualities of armed conflicts 
are getting worst.
Therefore the very first article of the GC 
stipulates that the High Contracting Parties 
undertake to respect and to ensure respect for 
the present Convention in all circumstances.3 In 
all circumstances means the obligation should 
be implemented both in peacetime and in the 
situation of armed conflict.
Although the GC is mainly governing 
armed conflict and consequently most of 
the articles are to be implemented in time of 
armed conflict, the Conventions also need to 
be implemented in peace time: for instance the 
part about dissemination of the Conventions. 
Article 47 of the (I) GC stipulates4: 
The High Contracting Parties undertake, 
in time of peace as in time of war, to 
disseminate the text of the present 
Convention as widely as possible in their 
respective countries, and, in particular, 
to include the study thereof in their 
programs of military and, if possible, 
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1  The Geneva Conventions 1949 consists of four Conventions. Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and 
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field. Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members 
of Armed Forces at Sea. Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War.
2  Excluded the Annexes.
3  Article 1 Geneva Conventions. The Article 1 is one of the common Articles to the Geneva Conventions, meaning the said Articles can 
be found in all Geneva Conventions 1949 (I, II, III and IV); the formulation of the said Articles are the same, sometimes the numbers 
are the same in each Convention ; I, II, III and IV.
4  Article 47 is also common articles. The same rule can be found in article 46 GC II, 127 GC III, and 144 GC IV.
civil instruction, so that the principles 
thereof may become known to the entire 
population, in particular to the armed 
fighting forces, the medical personnel and 
the chaplains.
This paper discusses the implementation of the 
above mentioned article within the Indonesian 
Armed Forces (TNI) in the period from 1998 
to 2015. Some achievements have been made 
by the TNI, however, there is still room for 
improvement.      
B. Dissemination to the Military and Civilian
The obligation to disseminate covers both the 
military and civilians. However, taking into 
account the nature of the conventions, priority 
should be given to the military. The objective of 
Article 47 GC I is the provisions of the Convention 
and the principles to be incorporated into 
the military education programs, especially 
among the armed fighting forces,5  the medical 
personnel and the chaplains.
Why is military more important than the 
civilians in this regard? It is because it would 
positively impact to the military operation 
which comply to the GC and international 
humanitarian law (IHL). The latter will be 
impacted to good behavior of combat of the 
soldiers in the battle field. The knowledge 
of law is essential to the application of the 
conventions as one of the worst enemies of the 
GC is ignorance.6 
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5  Armed fighting forces cover the regular forces (belonging to the government) and the irregular forces or the dissident armed forces. 
In Columbia and Sri Lanka, for example, GC was also dissemnated to irregular forces.
6 Jean S. Pictet et.al., Commentary I Geneva Convention, International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, 1952, p. 348.
7 Also known as the laws of war or the law of armed conflict. The Indonesian Red Cross Society (“PMI”) name it as “Hukum Perikema-
nusiaan Internasional” (the Law of international humanity). 
8 Faculty of Law of Trisakti University was a pioneer in the establishing IHL study centers in Indonesia. Other IHL study centersare found 
at Syiah Kuala University, Banda Aceh and Sam Ratulangi University, Manado North Sulawesi.
9 In particular between 1997 up to around 2003 the Trisakti IHL Study Centre ruling as the main reference sources for the study of IHL 
in Indonesia as it was at this centerthe referencematerials were available.
10 ICRC’s Delegation to Jakarta initiated the dissemination of IHL at Faculties of Political Science.
The obligation to disseminate knowledge 
is not novel. Article 1 of Hague Convention IV 
on Respecting the Laws and Customs of War 
on Land of 1907 stipulates that the Contracting 
Powers shall issue instructions to their armed 
land forceswhich shall be in conformity with 
the Regulations respecting the laws and 
customs of war on land, annexed to the present 
Convention.
In Indonesia the obligation to disseminate 
to the GC to civilians is implemented, among 
others, by the international humanitarian law 
(IHL)7 teaching  to the students of the Faculty 
of Law particularly those majoring in (public) 
international law. At some Faculty of Law IHL 
is a compulsory subject for the international 
law students. In addition, IHL study centers 
are established at some Faculties of Law. Such 
study centers complement the teaching of IHL 
for the student as well as being a forum for the 
lecturers to deepen their knowledge about IHL.8 
Students from other universities benefit from 
the study centers for their research project and 
their final papers.9
Starting a few years ago the subject of 
IHL is also taught at some Faculty of Political 
Science to students majoring on international 
relations.10 Perhaps in the near future the 
subject of IHL will also be taught at the Faculty of 
Medicine. The latter is necessary for Indonesia 
as all military doctors are alumna of Faculties 
of Medicine. In addition, one lesson learnt from 
the non-international armed conflict occurring 
in Aceh was that IHL and GC should be well 
understood by both military and civilian doctors 
and paramedics.
To implement the obligation under Article 
47 GC I TNI has incorporated the subject of 
IHL into the military training and education 
programs at all levels; from the lowest up to 
the highest level. The number of class hours, 
teaching materials and methods IHL given at 
each level of education and training is different 
one to another depending on the needs at each 
level of education respectively. 
C. IHL Teaching at the Military Academy
Military academy is one of the most strategic 
institution for any country to prepare the 
future nation’s high command. Almost all the 
commander in chiefs and generals are the 
alumna of military academy. Nevertheless, 
the teaching of IHL at the Indonesia military 
academy was far behind compare to other 
subjects.
IHL teaching at the military academy 
has been significantly improved after 1992. 
In 1990 a research team of the Law Faculty of 
Trisakti University led by the late Prof. GPH. 
Haryomataram, SH. Brig.Gen (ret.) conducted 
research on IHL teaching.11 The team examined 
the teaching on IHL at the higher education 
institutions i.e. the Military Academy and the 
Law Faculties. The objective of the research was 
to compare the teaching of IHL at the Faculty of 
Law and at the Military Academy.
The research conducted at some Law 
Faculties and the Indonesian Armed Forces 
Academy (AKABRI at the time). In 1990 AKABRI 
consisted of the Military Academy (Army) in 
Magelang, the Air Force Academy in Yogyakarta, 
the Naval Academy in Surabaya, and the Police 
Academy in Semarang. Until 1999 the branches 
of the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) were 
the Army, Navy, Air Force and Police.12 
The research team carried out an in-depth 
assessment on IHL knowledge of the students 
and cadets. Guided interview containing 
same questions was conducted towards the 
respondents both from the Military Academies 
and the Law Faculties. In addition, the interview 
was also conducted to the instructors as well 
as the lecturers. Furthermore, the syllabus, 
teaching materials and the references at the 
library were assessed.
The first conclusion of the research was 
that the level of understanding on IHL of the 
students at the Law Faculties were  better than 
the cadets at the Military Academies (Army, 
Navy, Air Force and Police). Secondly, that the 
quality of the teaching of IHL at the Faculty of 
Law was better than at the Military Academies.
Prof Haryomataram became somewhat 
surprised when the research team reported to 
him about the conclusions mentioned above. 
This was understandable as he was a former 
Brigadier General and also the instructor 
of IHL at the Army’s Military Academy in 
Magelang. It was difficult for him to believe 
that the understanding on IHL of the AKABRI’s 
cadet was lower than that of the civilian law 
students. In other words, how could it be 
that the understanding of the laws of war in 
the military was lower than among civilians. 
However, eventually, he could understand 
this after the research team explained about 
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11 The members of the research team were Endar Pulungan, S.H., IsmiWinarni, SH., Listyowati Sumanto, S.H., Fadillah Agus, S.H. 
12 From 1999 the Police separated from ABRI to become a civilian police force.
the methodology of the research i.e. guided 
interview with the same questions to all 
respondents; cadets and students. 
The same happened to the second 
conclusion. Prof Haryomataram, finally, 
understood that the quality of teaching on IHL 
at the Military Academieswas lower than at the 
Law Faculties after the research team explained 
to him that  the text book (“diktat”) used by the 
IHL instructors in 1990 was the book written by 
Prof. Haryo mataram in the 1970s.13 Moreover, 
the research team found that IHL was taught at 
the very first three months of education for the 
cadets with total 6 teaching hours including the 
exam.14 
The team then presented the research to 
the leader of AKABRI at the ABRI HQ in Cilangkap, 
East Jakarta, The team was welcomed by Brig.
Gen. Ade Picaulima, Deputy Commander of the 
General Commander of AKABRI accompanied by 
his staff. The research team presented in detail 
the research problems, methodology, data and 
information collected from the research as well 
as the conclusions and recommendations. 
The leader of AKABRI well accepted 
the results of the research and followed it up 
accordingly. Around 2000 the author had seen 
a significant improvement of IHL teaching  at 
the Army Military Academy, Magelang. The 
contents taught, the reference books and 
materials available at the library, the numbers 
of class hours given to the cadets as well as 
the quality of the instructors were very much 
improved compare with the situation in 1990.15 
In addition, at the same time, the research 
on the national implementation of GC in 
Indonesia jointly conducted by the IHL center of 
Syiah Kuala University, Banda Aceh and the IHL 
center of Sam Ratulangi University, Manado. 
The said research, among others, concluded 
that the IHL experts within TNI were getting 
better and their expertise was useful for the 
dissemination program as well as to be used as 
the military legal adviser.16 
D. Dissemination Program Started at the Legal 
Directorate
In 1998 the International Comittee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) welcomed by the Indonesian Army 
to conduct the dissemination program and the 
leader of the Indonesian Army agreed to the 
dissemination program plan accordingly.17 This 
shows that the policy of Army Leader is in line 
with the ratification of Geneva conventions by 
Indonesia.
The directive given by the leader of the 
Army was that the dissemination program 
should carried out jointly by the ICRC and the 
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13 The indicators which led to these conclusions were the curriculum, substances to be taught, total class hours, references materials 
available at the library and the knowledge of the instructors.  
14 The first three months of education focusing on physics and body building of the cadets. The IHL class became a “sleeping class” as it 
was taught in the afternoon after the cadets got a heavy physical exercise.
15 As the legal adviser of the ICRC Jakarta at that time the author had the opportunity to visit the Military Academy, Magelang, meet 
with the Head of Department and the IHL instructors and was able conducted a short assessment on the IHL teaching. 
16 IHL Center of Syiah Kuala University, Banda Aceh and Sam Ratulangi University, Manado, North Sulawesi, Research on the National 
Implementation on IHL, 2001, pages 233-234. 
17 The Chief of Staff, General Endriartono Sutarto, is agreed to the program. The concern of General Sutarto towards the legal aspects of 
the military operation shown, among others, when he wrote an article which concluded that the illegal order is not to be executed, 
Kompas, June 20, 2001page 4. The Assistant Operation to the Chief of Staff, Maj.Gen. Kiki Sjahnakri was very supportive to the pro-
gram as he was supported even pushing more operational officers to attend the dissemination session. 
Legal Directorate of the Army. The late Brig.
Gen.PLT. Sihombing, S.H., LL.M. served as the 
Director of the Legal Directorate. He played a 
significant role in the dissemination of IHL and 
GC to the members of TNI and in particular to 
the Army.18 
Why through the Legal Directorate? The 
Article 82 of the Additional ProtocolI of 1977 
(API)19 stipulates:
The High Contracting Parties at all times, 
and the Parties to the conflict in time of armed 
conflict, shall ensure that legal advisers are 
available, when necessary, to advise military 
commanders at the appropriate level on the 
application of the Conventions and this Protocol 
and on the appropriate instruction to be given 
to the armed forces on this subject.
The Commentary to the Additional 
Protocols 1977 states that the legal adviser 
could be selected either from the military 
or civilians.20 There are advantages and 
disadvantages to both alternatives. The 
advantages of those selected from the military, 
among others, is that they have a military 
training which enabling the persons concerned 
to evaluate situations from a tactical or strategic 
as well as from a technical point of view.21 
While the advantage of the civilian lawyers is 
that they are already specialists in the law of 
armed conflict.22 However, under the existing 
conditions, most likely the legal advisers within 
TNI are military or legal officer.  
The role of the legal officer is essential. 
The main task of the legal officer is to advise 
the military commander in time of armed 
conflict. Moreover, the legal adviser may be 
called upon to give legal opinion towards the 
military operations both during the planning of 
operations and while the military operations is 
on going.23 
Moreover, in time of peace, the legal 
adviser is essential for the education and 
training of the IHL to the members of the armed 
forces at any level. All IHL instructors within the 
education and training units of TNI, from the 
lowest up to the highest level, are legal officers. 
For example in the Army, the IHL instructors at 
the private and NCO school are the legal officers 
of each territorial military command (Kodam).24 
Within the command structure of the Kodam 
there is a Legal unit (Kumdam) headed by a 
Colonel, and the commander of the Kodam is 
a two star General. Furthermore, at the Joint 
Staff and Command College, the IHL instructors 
are the legal officers from the legal dept. of TNI 
HQ or from each of the services respectively. 
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18 After completing his duty as the Legal Director of the Army then he was assigned as the Head of Legal Bureau of the Defense Ministry. 
At the Ministry of Defense he continued the dissemination of IHL and Geneva Conventions in a more strategic level i.e. initiated the 
Decree of the Defense Minister on IHL in 2002. 
19 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed 
Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977.
20 Yves Sandoz et.al., Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (hereinafter 
as the Commenrary), ICRC – Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Geneva 1987, page. 955, para 3363.
21 Ibid, para. 3364.
22 Ibid., page 956, para. 3365.
23 For example the legal adviser may advise the commander on targeting and the choice of arms for a planned military operation, or the 
legal adviser may give the legal opinion on the issue of collateral damages during an ongoing military operation.  
24 There are thirteen Kodams in Indonesia .Each Kodam covering one or several provinces. The Indonesian Army has a decentralized 
recruitment system for the privates and NCOs. Their training is also run by the mother regiment of Kodam (“ResimenIndukKodam or 
Rindam). IHL is taught both at the private and t NCO school.  
Given the importance role of the legal 
adviser particularly in time of armed conflict, 
once appointed, they need to be integrated 
into the staff structure but also have direct 
access to the commander whenever they deem 
it necessary.25 In time of armed conflict, the 
legal adviser should always be available to the 
commander together with operational and 
intelligence assistant.26 
The above mentioned factors led 
the leader of the Army to decide that the 
dissemination on IHL should begin with the 
legal directorate. The late Brig. Gen. Sihombing 
said that it was necessary to equip the legal 
officers with an appropriate knowledge on IHL 
and GC in order for them to be able to execute 
their tasks properly in their respective units. 
Qualified legal advisers are required for the 
successful completion of military operations. 
The military operation is considered a success 
when it achieved the military goals without 
any, or at least with minimum, violation of 
law. In such military operation the commander 
should be accompanied by a qualified legal 
adviser who will advise him in commanding 
the operation included in the planning phase, 
so the commander will make decisions that are 
in line with IHL. These means that the violation 
of law is to be prevented prior to the military 
operation executed. Consequently the violation 
of law can be minimized or even an operation 
with zero violations could be accomplished. 
The principle that the instructions given 
by the  military commander or the head of state 
should be in accordance with the laws of war 
have been applied at least since the issuance 
of the Lieber Code in 1863. The Lieber Code is 
the first codification on the laws of war. It was 
prepared during the American Civil War by 
Prof. Francis Lieber of Columbia College in New 
York who got tasked by General Halleck and 
the instruction was issued by President Lincoln 
as Army Order 100 during the civil war in the 
USA. The content of the Lieber’s Code was 
complete and comprehensive as it was drafted 
by a Professor who had a comprehensive and 
in-depth understanding on the laws of war and 
military law.
Taking into consideration to the 
importance and the need for qualified legal 
advisers mentioned above, the participants of 
the first seminar and workshop (“penataran”) 
on IHL jointly organized by the Legal Directorate 
of the Army and the ICRC was the senior legal 
officers i.e. the Head of the Legal Unit of Regional 
Military Command (Kakumdam) from all over 
Indonesia. The session was also attended by 
the Head of the Legal Unit of the Main Army 
Command of TNI.27 In addition, the senior legal 
officers from the Navy and Air Force, as well as 
from the military justice (prosecutors and the 
judges), attended the “penataran”.  
Due to the operational situations faced 
by the Army, the contents of dissemination 
program not only covered the IHL and Geneva 
conventions (included the Additional Protocols) 
but also human rights. The knowledge and 
understanding of the human rights of the 
soldiers are needed as military operations 
conducted by the Indonesian Army are required 
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25 Terry D. Gill and Dieter Fleck (eds.), The Handbook of the International Law of Military Operations, Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 
551.
26 Brigiader Sihombing uttered this during the preparation meeting of the dissemination program at the Legal Directorate of Indonesian 
Army. 
27 The Main Army Command (“KotamaDarat”) of TNI is KOSTRAD (Army Reserve Command) and KOPASSUS (Army Special Force). 
to respect human rights.28 
To visualize situations where violations 
of IHL and HR are likely to occur, the author 
together with the Indonesian Army officers, 
have developed simulations or field exercises.29 
The scenarios include situations both from 
international and non-international armed 
conflict: and examples both of proper and 
improper, or law abiding and unlawful, 
behaviors are acted out by “actor-soldiers”. In 
the field, directly after the tableaus; have been 
played by the “actor-soldiers,” the participants 
in the trainings discuss the scenarios they just 
have observed and comment on irregularities 
and misbehavior they have identified. Also 
instances of proper behavior are identified.30 
In addition to the legal officers having 
comprehensiveness knowledge of the law of 
armed conflict, the understanding of officers in 
other branches, in particular the operational and 
intelligence units is also important. Therefore, to 
equip such officers with appropriate knowledge 
of IHL and human rights is needed and their 
attendance in the “penataran” is therefore 
essential.
A major challenge faced by the instructors 
of the dissemination program in the beginning 
was the hesitance and negative perception of 
IHL and human rights among the officers. Not 
only the operational and intelligence officers 
hesitant, but also some legal officers were 
suspicious even cynical towards the whole idea 
that military activity should be subject to law. 
They were in the opinion that IHL and human 
rights would hamper the military operation so 
that the goals of the military mission would 
never been achieved if the soldiers would have 
to fight in accordance with IHL rules and human 
rights.31 
A frequent complaint expressed by them 
was that when war crimes were committed 
by soldiers from developed countries the 
international community would be silent. 
They also frequently complained about the 
enforcement mechanisms, both nationally 
and internationally, which did not seem to be 
effective in addressing war crimes.32 
However, as time passed, this hesitance 
and negative perception slowly faded. At the 
same time more operational and intelligence 
officers attended the “penataran”. Their 
participation was influential to the quality of 
the program as during the sessions discussions 
was discussed about real cases that they had 
been involved. Such discussions made it clear 
to everybody that the law of armed conflict is 
not only law in book but also the law in action.33 
In addition to the trainings conducted 
in Jakarta, the dissemination program jointly 
conducted by the Legal Directorate and ICRC 
also ran courses at several “Kodams”. At the 
beginning priority was given to “Kodams” 
covering conflict prone areas.34 Latter the 
program ran in other “Kodams” aimed to 
increase the awareness and respect of IHL and 
human rights in any “Kodam”.          
Padjadjaran Journal of International Law
Volume 1, Number 1, January 2017
26
28 For example, the operation  at Central Sulawesi, Moluccas, North Moluccas and Papua.  
29 In this regard, the role of Maj. Ahmad Fadilah, S.H., M.H. is very essential.
30 Sometimes in order to give a real life effects, the simulation use the blank bullets and controlled explosives.
31 One of participant to the “penataran” mentioned that IHL like a blindfold put on a boxer while he is fighting against his opponent. The 
blindfolded boxer will never win the fight.
32 Questions, among others, regarding the invasion to Irak, Abu Ghraib case, Guantanamo case and cases involving Israel appeared 
frequently in all dissemination session.
33 The Chatham House rules are applied when real cases are discussed during the trainings. 
34 Priority given to the “Kodams” located in the prone area, such as Aceh, Sulawesi, Moluccas and Papua.  
Article 82 of AP I stipulates that legal 
advisers should be available, when necessary, 
to advise military commanders at the 
appropriate level. This article is flexible as 
its uses the wording “when necessary” and 
“at the appropriate level”. Therefore, the 
implementation of this article will vary from one 
country to another depending on the particular 
situation in respective country.35 
The wording of “at appropriate level” 
means that it is the discretion of each high 
contracting party to decide at what command 
level they will assign legal advisers. Within the 
structure of the combat units of the Indonesian 
Army, the lowest commander that is equipped 
with a legal adviser is the Division commander. 
For example, the Army Reserve Command 
(KOSTRAD) commanded by a Lieutenant 
General is equipped with a legal office headed 
by a Colonel. While each division of KOSTRAD 
is equipped with a legal officer with the rank of 
Major.36 The Brigade commanders of KOSTRAD 
are not equipped with legal officers.37  Whereas 
the Army Special Forces (KOPASSUS), which is 
commanded by a two star General, has a legal 
office headed by aLt.Col.38 
The posting of legal officers to the territorial 
commands is different from the combat units. 
As mentioned before within the “Kodam” 
structure there is a Legal Office (“Kumdam”) 
headed by a Colonel. Under the “Kodam” there 
are a number of Military Command Resorts 
(“Korems”) where each “Korem” covering 
several Districts. The “Korem” is commanded 
by a Colonel who is equipped with a small 
legal unit headed by a Major assisted by one 
Lieutenant and one sergeant.  Further down, 
under the “Korem” there are several District 
Military Commands (”Kodim”). Each “Kodim” 
covering one district and commanded by a Lt. 
Col. who is not equipped with any legal officer.
Although the provision of legal advisers is 
only found in the AP I which apply to international 
armed conflict sand is not regulated in Additional 
Protocol II which apply to non-international 
armed conflict, states practice shows that the 
obligation to have available legal advisers to 
the commander also apply to the situation of 
non-international armed conflict. The United 
States for instance, although until now the US 
is yet to ratify Additional Protocols I and II but 
US has implemented these provisions and make 
extensive use of legal advisor.39 Indonesia also 
has not ratified yet the Additional Protocols I 
and II but has implemented the legal adviser 
provisions in the non-international armed 
conflict in Aceh.  
E. The Positive impacts of Dissemination 
Program
One of the results of the intensive and extensive 
dissemination program has been that the 
awareness about IHL and human rights of the 
Indonesian Army has increased significantly. 
The Army applies a policy where they assign an 
ad hoc legal adviser attached to Battalions that 
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35 See the rule 141 and States practice at Jen-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, 
Cambridge University Press, 2005, Vol I and II. 
36 There are two divisions of KOSTRAD. Division 1 based in Cilodong, West Java and Division 2 based in Singosari, East Java.
37 With the exception of Group 3 of Division I that  equipped with a legal officer as its based in Kariango, South Sulawesi, is far from the 
Division HQ in Cilodong, West Java.
38 KOPASSUS consisted of three groups and one anti-terror detachment. None of them equipped with Legal Officer. 
39 Jean-Marie Heckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, loc.cit. The explanation in the previous paragraph shows that Indonesia also applies 
the rules on legal advisors even though Indonesia has not ratified the Additional Protocols 1977.
are deployed to operations.40 Although on the 
organizational map of personnel and equipment 
(“table organisasi dan peralatan or TOP”) of a 
Battalion that legal units or legal officers are not 
included but the Army Leader has leapfrogged 
these advances even though the “TOP” has not 
changed yet.41 
Another indication of the increasing 
awareness is the issuance of the Guidance Book 
for the Soldiers in the Implementation of Human 
Rights or the human rights pocket book in 2000 
by the Chief of Staff of the Army. The pocket 
book is distributed to soldiers at all level.42 The 
Army has not only distributed the book but also 
conducted a program to disseminate the pocket 
book to all units of the Army complemented 
with dissemination sessions jointly organized 
by the Legal Directorate and the ICRC. 
Moreover, the practice to include a legal 
annex in the operational order became common 
within the Army units. Nowadays, almost all 
operational orders are issued with a legal annex, 
whereas prior to 2000 legal annexes were not 
commonly used in the Indonesian Army.43 
A significant indication that the 
dissemination programs had a positive 
impact on the operations can be seen during 
the military operation conducted in Aceh in 
the period from 2002 to 2005. In 2002 the 
government of Indonesia decided to launch a 
full military operation to cope the Acehnese 
insurgency Free Aceh Movement (“GAM”). 
Military emergency rule was introduced and 
an Operational Command (“Komando Operasi 
or Koops”) was established in Aceh while the 
Emergency Military Provincial Authority was 
taking over the responsibilities of the civilian 
Governor. 
“Koops” was  commanded by a two star 
General who commanded a reinforced division 
supported by the Navy and the Air Force. 
The command structure of the “Koops” was 
equipped with a permanent Legal Task Force 
(“Satuan Tugas Hukum or Satgaskum”)  headed 
by a Colonel that served as the legal adviser to 
the “Koops” commander.44 The “Satgaskum” 
was tasked, among others, to conduct 
assessment together with intelligence staff 
whenever there was armed contact between 
TNI and GAM that caused damages in particular 
when such contact caused death either of TNI 
members, GAM or civilians.
Furthermore, all soldiers deployed in 
Aceh were equipped with a pocket card that, 
among other things, contained descriptions 
of the application of basic principles on IHL. In 
addition, the TNI HQ applied a policy of providing 
IHL briefings to combat units deployed in Aceh. 
These briefings were held at the naval base just 
prior to the soldiers were dispatched to their 
respective posts.45 
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40 Ad hoc assignment means the legal officer will go back to his legal unit after the operation is accomplished and the concerned Battal-
ion returns back to their home base. 
41 Brig.Gen. Arief Siregar, the Director of Legal Directorate who replaced Brig. Gen. Sihombing, told the author that the policy undertak-
en by the Army Leader  was because of the operational and tactical considerations so the Battalion commander in the operation area 
needed to be accompanied by the legal officer.   
42 The book was accessible at the Indonesian Army’s website.
43 Within the operational order structure of the Indonesian Army the legal annex is placed under Annex G or H.
44 A permanent “Satgaskum” which is structured within the operation command had never existed before.  
45 The aim of the final briefing is to strengthen the IHL and human rights message to the soldiers just before they were deployed to the 
battle field. Usually it was organized at the hall or in the field of naval base where the unit had landed, either at Belawan Medan, 
Malahayati Banda Aceh or Krueng Guekueh Lhokseumawe. 
Besides the impact on the operation 
mentioned above, the dissemination also 
impacted on training. A lot more IHL and 
human rights were provided at pre-deployment 
training.46 Moreover, some tactics, both 
individual and at unit level, had to be modified 
in order to fit the requirements of IHL and 
human rights.47 
One important pillar with regard to IHL 
and HR dissemination was the issuance of the 
Technical Guidance Book for the Application 
of IHL and Human Rights in Training (“Buku 
Petunjuk Teknik Penerapan Hukum Humaniter 
dan HAM Dalam Latihan Penyelenggaraan/ 
Bujuknik Garlat HHI dan HAM”) issued by the 
Training and Education Command of the Army 
(“Kodiklat AD”) in July 2003.48 This technical 
guidance book is part of the training doctrine 
of the Indonesian Army. The content of the 
book is made so that it is applicative and 
easy to implement by the different units in 
their training programs at different levels and 
among different combat and support units.49 
Interestingly, even though Indonesia has not 
ratified yet the Additional Protocols 1977 some 
of the rules from the AP 1977 were referenced 
to in at the guidance book.  
Another notable impact was the Minister 
of Defense’s Decree number 2 of 2002. The 
decree stipulates that IHL, Geneva conventions, 
international customary law and human rights 
applies to the state’s defense efforts. The decree 
stipulates that this will be regulated further by 
Commander in Chief of TNI.50 
Last, but not least, in 2010 the Commander 
in Chief of TNI issued a Commander’s 
directive51 which prohibits the use of torture 
by TNI members. Indonesia ratified the 
Convention against Torture in 1998 but has 
yet to integrate the convention into national 
legislation.52 The TNI Commander’s directive is 
an important and interesting breakthrough on 
the implementation of the Convention against 
Torture even though this directive can only be 
enforced internally within TNI.  
F. Operational Approach on IHL Training
The ultimate objective of article 47 GC I is the 
IHL and the principles of the GC is implemented 
in any military operation and so the 
unnecessary causalities of the armed conflict 
can be minimized. Some of the most influential 
actors that can contribute to achieve these 
objectives are the commanders, operational 
and intelligence officers and, last but not least, 
the soldiers in the field. Therefore the more 
the commanding, operational and intelligence 
officers have attended dissemination sessions 
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46 Pre-deployment training is a training required for a unit prior to their deployment. For example a Battalion required a three months 
pre-deployment training for a 6 – 9 months operation. The aim of the training is to enhance the military tactic and skills of the sol-
diers.   
47 For example the individual tactic on checking of the dead body or the unit tactic on searching and cordon of the house.
48 The issuance of this book was initiated by Brig. Gen. Bambang Darmono, then the Director of Training at “Kodiklat”, who later became 
the Commander of “Koops” in Aceh and then later again became the Commander of “Kodiklat”. 
49 For example, the technical guidance given can be applied for a squad up to battalion level of training of the operation, intelligence 
or logistic branches, even for the fire support unit. The book drafted by a team consisted of the Indonesian Army officers where the 
author was the only civilian being the member of the drafting team.   
50 The decree was initiated by the late Brig. Gen. Sihombing, the Head of Legal Bureau of the Ministry of Defense.
51 Peraturan Panglima TNI tentang Penentangan Terhadap Penyiksaandan Perlakuan Lain yang Kejam Dalam Penegakan Hukum di 
Lingkungan TNI (PERPANG/73/IX/2010).
52 One of the recommendation of the Universal Periodical Review convened by the UN Human Rights Council that has not been imple-
mented by Indonesia so far is to enact national legislation on it as so far the torture neither included in the criminal code nor in other 
national legislation.
the more should the military operation be 
conducted in line with the rules.
In 2005, FRR Law Office53  in cooperation 
with the Army and the Norwegian Center for 
Human Rights (NCHR) organized a seminar on 
IHL in non-international armed conflict (NIAC). 
The topic NIAC was being chosen as this is the 
most likely type of armed conflict to occur in 
the country. The seminar lasted for two days 
and was attended by the Operational and 
Intelligence Assistant of “Kodams”. During the 
seminar military and legal aspects of NIAC 
were elaborated on. The seminar contributed 
towards a common understanding among 
the influential officers of the “Kodam”, i.e. 
Operational and Intelligence assistants across 
the country about the importance; as well as 
the self-interest of TNI to comply with IHL and 
respect human rights in the situation of NIAC. 
From 2005 u to 2015 FRR in cooperation 
with the Army Legal Directorate and further 
with TNI HQ, i.e. the Legal Department and 
the Operational Staff conducted dissemination 
program. The program was funded by the 
Norwegian Center for Human Rights, University 
of Oslo, which also contributed with experts, 
both civilian and military, to the program.54 
The program focused on the combat units of 
the Army as well as some Battalions under the 
command structure of the “Kodam”.55 
The nomenclature used for the IHL 
dissemination program has been changed 
from seminar and workshops (“penataran”) to 
training (“latihan”). The reason for this was that 
in order to achieve better compliance with IHL 
and human rights by the soldiers, training rather 
than seminars and workshops was essential. 
Also because the real objective that the trainings 
should contribute to was to integrate IHL and 
human rights into “the muscles and bones” 
of the soldiers rather than merely “stick it in 
their brains”. Moreover, a prominent training 
doctrine for soldiers in any country of the world 
is “do what you train and train what you do”. So 
the training is more suitable then seminars and 
workshops of the aim is behavioral changes. 
A session on counter insurgency strategy 
(COIN) and tactics related to IHL was also 
included into the training program. COIN and 
IHL should be seen as connected since the main 
objective of a counter insurgency operation is to 
win the hearts and minds of the people.  This can 
partly be gained by applying IHL and respecting 
human rights in such operations. The case 
study on counter insurgency was developed in 
order to underpin the usefulness of IHL and to 
stimulate two way communication.56 
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53 FRR (Fadillah Rivai Rizki) Law Office is a private Law Firm. In addition to provide legal services like other Law firms, litigation and 
non-litigation, the Firm also runs a non-profit program, i.e. capacity building program on IHL and human rights within TNI. The pro-
gram has been conducted in cooperation with TNI and the Norwegian Center of Human Rights, funded by the Norwegian government 
and partly by the Canadian and Australian government.  FRR run the program parallel and in coordination with the ICRC in order to 
avoid overlapping and duplication.   
54 The program was an implementation of Bilateral Dialogue on Human Rights between Indonesia and Norway. In 2013 and 2014 the 
program conducted international training in cooperation with the International Institute of Humanitarian Law, San Remo, Italy, at-
tended by officers from several Asian countries. 
55 The program was able conducted IHL and Human Rights training at Infantry Battalions in conflict prone areas, such as Aceh, Poso 
(Central Sulawesi), Moluccas and North Moluccas. In addition, the program covered all Infantry Battalions in Papua and West Papua. 
Moreover, the IHL training was regularly and continuously conducted at the Army Special Forces (“Kopassus”) from 2007 up to 2015 
where members of Norwegian Army’s Special Forces were also part of the instructor teams.  
56 The sessions were led by Norwegian Army officer who had experience from counter insurgency operations in Afghanistan. Thepartic-
ipant officers shared their experiences which opened up for constructive two ways discussions.
The inclusion of the counter insurgency 
perspective is essential for the Indonesia context 
in particular related the military operation in 
Aceh. The situation in Aceh qualified as a non-
international armed conflict where the TNI was 
fighting against the armed wing of the Free 
Aceh Movement Forces (in bahasa Indonesia: 
“GAMBersenjata”). The question on applying 
IHL and the Geneva Convention in Aceh was 
controversial. On one side was the view that 
the IHL applies while the other side claimed 
that IHL did not apply. The debate around 
whether the situation in Aceh qualified as a 
non-international armed conflict or merely as 
internal disturbances and tension.57 However, 
such academic debate was avoided, as much 
possible, in the training session. The message 
passed on in the training was that regardless 
of the qualification of the situation the 
principles of humanity had to be respected and 
implemented in any TNI operation.
The instructors consisted of military and 
civilian experts both Indonesian nationals and 
the foreigners.58 The advantage of the foreigner 
instructors, both civilian and military, among 
others, was that they could share perspectives 
from a different point of view so the participants 
could compare how these questions are 
solved in other countries. Importantly, the 
foreigner officers were able to speak with the 
participants in the same language i.e. “the 
soldier’s language”.     
One of important element in any 
current military operation is ROEs (Rules of 
Engagement). Within ROEs is included the 
political, legal and military considerations for 
the concerned military operation. ROEs are 
the commander instrument in commanding his 
unit. Well-made ROEs would lead the concerned 
unit to achieve their mission and at the same 
time contribute to prevent or minimize both 
unnecessary suffering and violations of law. 
Whereas ROEs are important, up until recently 
they have not commonly been used by the 
Indonesian Army. 
Taking into consideration the above 
mentioned, the topic of ROEs was inserted 
into the training program. On top of that, one 
and half days, or two days of a four or five days 
training was allocated as a workshop on ROEs. 
Subsequently the title of the training became 
“IHL and Human Rights Training and Workshop 
on ROEs”. Moreover, a set of ROEs and case 
studies had been developed for the purpose of 
these trainings.59 
The insertion of ROE into the IHL training 
started around 2008. After some training 
sessions had been conducted the awareness 
of the importance of ROEs increased.  Several 
Army units began to apply ROEs in their 
operational planning and training. In 2010 a 
workshop on ROEs was conducted at the TNI 
HQ and was attended by senior officers from 
all the main command units of TNI (“Kotama 
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57 The author is in the opinion that the situation in Aceh qualified as a non-international armed conflict where the IHL and Article 3 
of the GC is apply. See, Fadillah Agus, “The Internal Armed Conflict in Indonesia According to the Geneva Conventions 1949 and its 
Second Additional Protocol 1977 in relation with the Indonesian Criminal Code”, Dissertation, Padjadjaran University, Bandung, 2011, 
pages 223 – 296.
58 Civilian experts and Norwegian Army officers are part of the instructors contributed by NCHR to the program. 
59 Thanks to Lt.Col. Moen Stein of the Norwegian Army who dedicated his time to develop the training tools called “the FRR ROE Exer-
cise”. With some modification and adjustment to the command structure as well as strategy, tactic and technicalities of the TNI so the 
tools is suitable to be used in the Indonesian Army training. 
TNI“) covering Army, Navy and Air Force. The 
workshop resulted in a common understanding 
of ROE related issues among the participants. 
As a follow-up of this workshop a series of 
seminar on ROEs were conducted in TNI HQ and 
attended by senior officers i.e. Colonels and Lt. 
Colonels.   
The impact can be seen in 2011 and 2012 
where TNI HQ issued three set of ROEs, i.e. 
ROE for the operation in conflict prone areas; 
ROE for operations in border areas; and ROE 
on military support to Police operations. In 
addition, a Guidance Book for Drafting ROE 
was also issued. The ROEs were issued in the 
form of the Commander in Chief Regulation 
(“Peraturan Panglima / Perpang”).
FRR was also organized IHL training for the 
Navy and the Air Force. Even if the trainings for 
the Navy and the Air Force were not as extensive 
as those for the Army but the quality was the 
same. This program also had an operational 
approach and the instructors were also a mix of 
military and civilians, both Indonesian nationals 
and foreigners.60 
Due to the nature of Naval and Air Force 
operations, the context being used in the 
trainings was the international armed conflict 
Therefore, not so many case studies related 
to Indonesia were presented during these 
trainings. However, the operation to release 
an Indonesian merchant ship hijacked by 
Somalian pirates was one interesting case study 
discussed. Moreover, the Royal Australian 
Navy practice in conducting their tasks as the 
law enforcement officials at the same time as 
they were the state defense apparatus was a 
valuable lesson for the Indonesian Navy officers 
attending the trainings.
References and written materials on IHL 
related to Naval and Air Force operations are 
limited, and none of them have been available 
in Bahasa Indonesia. In order to fill the gap, 
the San Remo Manual on the International 
Law Applicable in the Armed Conflict at Sea 
has been translated into bahasa Indonesia.61 
In addition, with the permission of the 
International Institute of Humanitarian Law, 
FRR also translated the IIHL Hand Book on 
ROEs. These materials are very useful for TNI 
members in order to deepen their knowledge 
and understanding on IHL related issues. 
G. The Challenges
Some achievements of the dissemination work 
was made during the period from 1998 to 
2015 i.e. from increased awareness to more 
tangible effects such as changes to operational 
approaches and doctrine. However, the said 
achievements could have been achieved faster 
if the operational and intelligence officers, and 
in particular the commanding officers, had been 
involved in the dissemination session earlier. 
For instance, a five days IHL training session 
conducted in 2008 at the Division 2 of KOSTRAD 
certainly gave a positive and immediate impact 
to the unit. This was partly due to the fact that 
the participants at this training were battalion 
and company commanders. Commanding 
officers are seemingly more credible and 
effective than legal officers in conveying the IHL 
and human rights messages to their units.
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60 Most of trainings that organized by FRR for the Navy and Air Force were supported by the Australian government. Australian Navy 
officers from the Asia Pacific Center for Military Law, as well as from the Australian Air Force were instructors at some of the training 
sessions. 
61 The Manual is translated by a team consisting of Navy officers and ICRC staff (including the author). The translation book was signed 
by Chief of Staff of the Navy, Admiral Kent Sondakh.  
Moreover, the composition and 
qualification of the training team is essential 
in order to achieve the objectives of the 
training. One ideal team should consist of 
legal, operational, intelligence and training 
officers.62 Given the size of TNI63 and the 
territory of the country, there is a need to 
establish specially designed teams that are 
tasked with the responsibility of IHL and human 
rights dissemination within the TNI. This should 
not be difficult for TNI nowadays as there are 
several officers from all branches that possess 
appropriate knowledge on IHL. Whereas much 
IHL knowledge may be in place, the capability of 
legal officers to comprehend military strategy, 
tactics and even battle technic needs to be 
improved. 
Most dissemination session within TNI that 
the author has observed have been run and lead 
by legal officers, this also include simulations 
and field exercise sessions. This may create the 
misunderstanding that what is learned during 
dissemination sessions is merely legal issues 
of little operational relevance. Furthermore, 
this also creates the misperception expressed 
by some officers: “forget the tactics during 
legal training and forget the law during tactical 
training”. 
As NIAC is the most likely kind of conflict 
to occur in Indonesia in the foreseeable future, 
the training program should also be targeting 
soldiers at the lower levels i.e. private and 
sergeants, and in particular infantry soldiers. 
The program and curriculum should be 
designed in such a way that it closely resembles 
conventional warfare64  and counter insurgency 
operations. 
The objective of the trainings is to make 
the soldiers’ behavior in the combat battle 
field compliant with IHL and HR and to make 
it integrate into the muscles and bones of the 
soldiers rather than merely stick it in their brains. 
Therefore the contents and methodology of 
the trainings should be designed in such a way 
that the practical aspects are highlighted and 
the theoretical side of the law is given less 
prominence.
The issuance of the three standing ROEs 
mentioned will hopefully positively influence 
TNI operation in the future. It will become 
significantly easier for TNI units to develop 
ROEs required for their operations as standing 
ROEs and guidance to draft the ROEs now is 
available. However the knowledge and skills 
of the commanding, operational as well as 
legal officers to draft suitable ROEs need to be 
improved, particularly their skills on drafting 
ROEs related to NIAC. In this regard TNI needs 
to have its own military manual on IHL. Such a 
manual will reflect the TNI‘s views, policies and 
perception of IHL related issues.65 
The awareness and implementation of IHL 
within the TNI today is far better than it was 
prior to 1998. To consolidate this development a 
general corps seminar on IHL and human rights 
should be organized. Such a seminar should be 
attended by brigadier generals up to the Chief 
of Defense and focus on the philosophy and 
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62 It would be fine if at the beginning phase the embryo of the team consists of a qualified legal officers which then is complement by 
other officers from other branches in order to form a solid and comprehensive instructor team. 
63 The members of TNI by 2014 is  314,271 personnel;  Ministry of Defense, State Defense Posture, 2014, page 26.
64 No need to include in the program, for example, the electronic warfare as this is too complicate for the foot soldiers and less likely to 
happen in the NIAC in Indonesia.  
65 An initial draft has been initiated and drafted by FRR. Due to some constraint the work has been postponed.
values of IHL and human rights related to the 
military operations conducted by the TNI. 
A remaining challenge is law enforcement 
in the military realm. The intensive and extensive 
dissemination work has in fact reduced 
the amount of violations of law in military 
operations. Still, occasionally violations occur. 
This should not be seen abnormal as there is no 
one that can guarantee a military operation to 
be conducted without any violations occurred. 
However, it is important how violations of law 
are dealt with by the military leader. Can we 
expect the military justice system to deliver 
due process of law and independent and 
reliable handling of cases where violations have 
taken place? In this regard, an impartial and 
independent military justice system is required 
to guarantee a fair trial with no impunity. 
A national legislative measures, i.e. to 
regulate war crimes as enshrined in Article 
49 GC I should be done by Indonesia. Neither 
the Indonesian Penal Code nor the Military 
Penal Code regulates the war crimes.  Even if 
the country has an impartial and independent 
justice system but it is difficult to deal with war 
criminals as the war crime regulations yet to be 
existed. Fortunately, the war crimes articles are 
now included in the new draft Penal Code.66 
Article 47 of GC I should not be read 
as an independent article. The inspiration 
of this article came from Article 1 GC which 
gives an obligation to the High Contracting 
Parties to respect and ensure the respect 
of the convention. Further, based on Article 
87 of AP I, the commander has the duty to 
prevent, suppress and to report to competent 
authorities breaches of the Conventions and of 
the Protocol. Therefore, dissemination or legal 
training is one way for commander to fulfil his 
duty to prevent breaches.
In order to be more effective in fulfilling 
his duty, based on Article 82 AP I, the 
commander should be equipped with a legal 
adviser. Subsequently, TNI required a credible 
and suitable legal unit which able to provide an 
appropriate legal advises needed. Therefore, it 
is recommended that the legal department or 
unit under the TNI’s structure is complement 
with a unit or section responsible for IHL and/
or operational law. There is no such section in 
the existing legal unit under the TNI structure 
so far. Such a section is required at the TNI HQ, 
the service HQ down to the combat units at 
division level. The operational law section will 
have a central role as legal adviser as enshrined 
in the Article 82 AP I. However, there is no need 
to have such section at “Kodam”, even though 
“Kodam” is equal to the division, as the nature 
of the “Kodam” is a territorial unit and not a 
combat unit. Whenever a “Kodam” is assigned 
to function as a combat unit it could then 
equipped with an ad hoc IHL/operational law 
unit. 
Moreover, the existing position of the legal 
units within the TNI is under the supervision 
of the assistant for personnel needs to be 
reviewed. Such position within the organization 
provides the legal unit with a non-operational 
function.67 It also leads to limited access for 
the legal unit to the commander. It would be 
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66 Book II, Chapter IX, Article 396 – 399 Draft Penal Code 2012. The draft has been sent by the Government to the Parliament and the 
Parliament is now working  on it.
67 The task and function of the legal unit is very much occupied with  judiciary matters, contracts and legal problems related with ad-
ministrative and personnel issues. 
preferable to put the legal unit under the 
supervision of the assistant of operations, or 
at least, that the operational law/ IHL section 
of the legal unit is under the supervision of the 
assistant of operations. Another option would 
be to create a new separate operational law 
unit under the assistant of operation   
Article 2 section (4) of the Law No. 34 
of 2004 on TNI stipulates that one of the 
identities of a TNI soldier is as a professional 
soldier. The requirement for a professional 
soldier mentioned there, are among others, 
well trained, well-educated, well-equipped, 
respect human rights, national law as well 
as international law that has been ratified by 
Indonesia. Therefore, in the Indonesian case, 
Article 47 GC I should be implemented in the 
form of trainings related to operations where 
the desired output should be the shaping of 
professional soldiers  who abide by national 
and international law respectively. 
H. Concluding Remarks
Article 47 of GC I is closely related with articles 
1 and 49 of the Geneva Convention I as well 
as articles 82 and 87 Additional Protocol I. The 
appropriate ROEs, soldier’s behavior in combat 
and the reliable enforcement mechanism are the 
indicators that the IHL dissemination program 
had been succeed.  Even though violations are 
constant and present everywhere, Indonesia 
can be a good example to highlight situations 
where IHL has indeed been respected and show 
that it can have a positive impact.
Bibliography
Books
IHL Center of Syiah Kuala University, Banda Aceh 
and Sam Ratulangi University, Manado, 
North Sulawesi, Research on the National 
Implementation on IHL, 2001.
Fadillah Agus
The Implementation of Article 47 Geneva Convention I to the Military
35
Henckaerts, Jen-Marie and Louise Doswald-
Beck, Customary International 
Humanitarian Law, Vol. I and II, Cambridge 
University Press, 2005.
Pictet, Jean S., et.al., Commentary I Geneva 
Convention, International Committee of 
the Red Cross, Geneva, 1952.
Sandoz, Yves, et.al., Commentary on the 
Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to 
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, ICRC - Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
Geneva 1987.
Gill, Terry D., and Dieter Fleck (eds.), The 
Handbook of the International Law of 
Military Operations, Oxford University 
Press, 2011.
Law Instruments
Declaration on Human Rights 1948.
Geneva Convention 1949 and its Protocols.
Law No. 59 of 1958 concerning Indonesia 
participating in All Geneva Conventions.
Other Sources
Fadillah Agus, “The Internal Armed Conflict 
in Indonesia According to the Geneva 
Conventions 1949 and its Second 
Additional Protocol 1977 in relation 
with the Indonesian Criminal Code”, 
Dissertation, Padjadjaran University, 
Bandung, 2011.
Legal Documents
Declaration on Human Rights 1948.
Geneva Convention 1949 and its Protocols.
Law No. 59 of 1958 concerning Indonesia 
participating in All Geneva Conventions.
